NETANYAHU SPEAKS: The Israel-Palestine Ball Remains in Obama’s Court

Israeli Prime
Minister Binyamin Netanyahu threw a rhetorical bone to President Obama
in his much anticipated speech on June 14, when he used the term
“Palestinian state.” But he conceded nothing of substance, reiterating
Israel’s continuing rejection of real Palestinian statehood,
independence, sovereignty, and self-determination. He demanded that the
Palestinians recognize and accept Israel as the “national homeland of
the Jewish People,” not a state of all its citizens, thus requiring
Palestinians to accept the legitimacy of Israel’s discriminatory
practices. And his speech continued Israel’s escalation of threats
against Iran.


Now the
Israeli-Palestinian ball remains squarely in President Obama’s court –
and the results will be determined largely by his administration’s
decision on whether or not to use real (i.e., financial or diplomatic)
pressure, rather than relying solely on public or private urging, for
Israel to comply with U.S. wishes. Without concrete consequences for
Tel Aviv’s noncompliance -such as withholding all or part of the $3
billion annual U.S. military aid to Israel, or withdrawing the U.S.
diplomatic protection that keeps Israel from being held accountable in
the UN Security Council – Obama’s demands for a settlement freeze or
anything else will have little impact.

“Palestinian
State

It was no surprise
that Netanyahu acceded to Obama’s demand that he utter the words
“Palestinian state.” Despite outrage among his far-right backers, words
are relatively cheap: he never even said the word “Palestine,” nor did
he refer to a “two-state solution” or two states in any form. Instead,
Netanyahu described “two free peoples,” each with a flag and an anthem.
What’s missing is anything remotely resembling equality or justice.

Netanyahu described
“a demilitarized Palestinian state side-by-side with the Jewish state.”
He described a non-sovereign, non-independent, non-contiguous
“Palestinian state” that would be forcibly demilitarized by
international guarantee rather than any internal choice; a “Palestinian
state” with no control of its own airspace; a “Palestinian state” with
no control of its own borders; a “Palestinian state” with no right to
sign treaties; and a “Palestinian state” without Jerusalem. His
putative “Palestinian state” has no known borders, since territory
would be determined only in later negotiations. Israeli settlements, as
well as the Apartheid Wall, the closed military zones, the checkpoints,
the settlers-only roads, bridges, tunnels built on stolen Palestinian
land, and continue to divide the West Bank into tiny non-contiguous
cantons or Bantustans, all remain in place.

Settlements

Netanyahu
completely rejected Obama’s call for a settlement freeze. “We have no
intention to build new settlements or set aside land for new
settlements,” Netanyahu said. So all expansion of existing
settlements – not only for the so-called “natural growth” which
Netanyahu and President Obama openly tussled over – will continue.
Palestinian land, therefore, will continue to be “set aside” – a polite
euphemism for “stolen” – to expand any or all of the existing Jewish
settlements as far as any nationalist or religious extremists (or, for
that matter, any of the yuppie settlers who make up the majority of the
settler population) may wish to build them.

The fundamental
problem of the settlements, of course, is not just the creeping
expansion – it’s their very existence. All Israeli settlements in the
West Bank or Arab East Jerusalem – not only the tiny propaganda-driven
“outposts” but the huge city settlements like Ariel or Ma’ale Adumim or
the oldest settlements long described as “neighborhoods” of Jerusalem –
are illegal. The 4th  Geneva Convention Article 49(6) prohibits the
occupying power from transferring any of its own population into the
occupied territory – settlers don’t become legal just because they live
in giant cities of 35,000 or 40,000 people or because they stay for
more than 40 years. The existence of the settlements represents a
continuing violation – and even if Obama managed to impose a full
freeze on all settlement activity, there is no indication yet of what
(if anything) he intends to do about the 480,000 illegal Israeli
settlers continuing to occupy those (however frozen) Jews-only
settlements across the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

Israel
as the “State of the Jewish people”

This formulation, a
version of which Obama used in his Cairo speech, is very dangerous.
Netanyahu demanded that the Palestinians not only recognize Israel (a
diplomatic action Palestinians have long expressed willingness to do in
return for Israeli recognition of an independent sovereign Palestinian
state), but that they recognize Israel as a Jewish state.
That means recognizing as legitimate Israel’s official discrimination
against its non-Jewish citizens. Such recognition would also accept
Israel’s violation of the international laws guaranteeing Palestinian
refugees the right to return to their homes on the grounds that a large
number of returning refugees would change the demographic balance. It
might indeed end Israel’s permanent Jewish majority, but no government
has a “right” to ensure a preferred racial or religious or ethnic
majority by expelling, transferring, denying rights, or discriminating
against those outside the chosen parameters.

Netanyahu actually
admitted he does not believe Israel is bound by international law or
treaties. Israel, he said, needs only to “take into account”
international considerations. “We have to recognize international
agreements,” he said, but pay equal attention to “principles important
to the State of Israel.” Under that theory, agreements Israel had
already accepted, such as the 2003 “road map” which required Israel to
freeze all settlements including “natural growth,” or UN Resolution 273
of 1949 which welcomed Israel into the United Nations on condition that
it accept the Palestinians’ right of return, are irrelevant and can be
violated with impunity if they don’t match “principles important to the
State of Israel.”

Israel,
the Arab world and Iran

Netanyahu echoed
Obama’s call for normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab
states. Netanyahu’s vision of that “reconciliation” is clearly tied to
his effort to establish, with U.S. backing, an Israeli-Arab alliance
against Iran, describing his effort “to forge an international alliance
to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.” The recent Iranian
elections certainly helped Netanyahu. He will use a confirmed victory
for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the disputed elections, or even
continued uncertainty, protests, and instability in Iran, as evidence
for his claim that Iran remains a direct and immediate threat to
Israel. Netanyahu described the Iranian election itself as
demonstrating that threat and said the “greatest danger confronting
Israel, the Middle East, the entire world, and human race, is the nexus
between radical Islam and nuclear weapons.” His audience at that moment
was not only hard-line voters at home, but Israel’s supporters in
Congress and elsewhere in the United States, using the “Iranian threat”
to counter any U.S. unease regarding his rejection of Palestinian
self-determination.

It remains
uncertain how far Obama is prepared to go in building such a regional
anti-Iran alliance. In his speech in Cairo two weeks ago, Obama urged
Arab governments to implement only those parts of the 2002 Arab peace
initiative calling for normalization with Israel, while ignoring the
critical Israeli actions the plan recognizes are needed before such
normalization could take place. The Arab plan, endorsed by the 22
nations of the Arab League, did offer normalization with Israel, but
only in exchange for complete Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders,
sharing of Jerusalem, a just solution to the Palestinian refugee crisis
based on international law, and more. Netanyahu followed Obama’s lead
in ignoring the Israeli obligations, and in demanding that Arab
governments immediately establish peace treaties, full diplomatic
relations, trade, tourism – in essence, full normal relations – with
Israel, getting nothing in return.

The danger is that
such state-to-state normalization between Israel and any or all Arab
governments, if carried out with Israel’s occupation and apartheid
policies intact, undermines Palestinian claims, weakens the Palestinian
position in the region and internationally, and legitimizes Israeli
violations of international law. The call for such one-sided
normalization may also be linked to an effort by the Obama
administration to push Israel towards new negotiations with Syria –
separating that process from the Palestinian track. Such negotiations
could lead to some important movement towards ending the Israeli
occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights. But such a move could
simultaneously endanger the central component of Israel’s occupation of
Palestine. Israel would try to convince the Obama administration and
the U.S. Congress that any withdrawal from the Golan would be so
traumatic for Israel that the United States cannot press for any motion
on ending occupation in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, let
alone for ending Israel’s lethal siege of Gaza. Just such an impact
occurred after Israel withdrew from the Egyptian Sinai in the context
of the 1979 Camp David Accord. Israel won support for its position that
the return of the sparsely populated Sinai peninsula to Egypt was
sufficient to fulfill any requirement in UN Resolution 242 (or anywhere
else) that Israel withdraw from the territories it had occupied in the
1967 war.

The outcome of the
disputed Iranian elections remains uncertain. Civil engagement,
protest, and mobilization is occurring at a level not seen at least
since the student uprisings of 1999; some observers say not since the
Islamic revolution of 1979. But the results remain unclear. It’s
important that Obama has remained careful and respectful in his
response, raising concerns about government suppression and the street
violence but making clear that “it is up to Iranians to make decisions
about who Iran’s leaders will be, that we respect Iranian sovereignty.
Crucially, he said the United States “will continue to pursue a tough,
direct dialogue between our two countries.” Public pressure must be
maintained to insure that Israeli threats of military force against
Iran are not backed up by the United States.

Now, in
Obama’s court…

Questions remain.

  • Will Obama
    accept Netanyahu’s rhetorical use of the words “Palestinian state” as a
    major concession, sufficient to demand new concessions from the
    Palestinians?
  • If Netanyahu
    moves one step further and calls for some kind of settlement freeze
    (whether or not it is actually imposed on the ground), will that be
    greeted as an important new concession with no response to the
    continuing illegality of the existing settlements?
  • Will the
    Obama administration’s regional strategy focus on building an
    Israeli-Arab alliance against Iran despite Obama’s stated commitment to
    new negotiations with Iran “without preconditions on the basis of
    mutual respect”?
  • How will
    Obama respond if there are a few more rhetorical concessions from
    Netanyahu, even if there is no actual motion on the ground on
    Palestinian rights?

Or, looking
forward…

  • Will Obama
    send his envoy, former Senator George Mitchell, to inform the Israeli
    government that Washington’s next step will be the withholding of this
    year’s $3 billion in U.S. military aid to Israel until there is
    evidence on the ground, not only in words, of a complete halt in
    building, selling, recruiting residents, or any other activity in any
    of the settlements?
  • Will Obama
    announce that continuing to sponsor bilateral Palestinian-Israeli talks
    is futile when the disparity of power remains so profound, and that
    instead the new U.S. policy will be to support regional negotiations
    based solely on international law and all relevant UN resolutions as
    the basis for ending occupation and establishing a just and
    comprehensive peace in the region?

Okay. Maybe that
last one is still a ways down the line. But stay tuned.

Phyllis
Bennis is the author of
Understanding the Palestinian-Israeli
Conflict: A Primer. She is a fellow at the Institute for Policy
Studies and works with the U.S.
Campaign to End Israeli Occupation
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