1948 "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" for Israel
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- Written by Uri Avnery Uri Avnery
- Published: 12 May 2008 12 May 2008
- Hits: 4411 4411
[Uri Avnery's narrative differs significantly from the account given by Ilan Pappe's recent book, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Avnery is not willing to accept that Plan "D" was a deliberate effort at ethnic cleansing. Of course, the viewpoint of the person on the ground in the fighting is different from the viewpoint of an historian trying to see the bigger picture. Which is one reason why a truth an reconciliation commission is of such great value: that all the people's stories and own viewpoints, totally valid for them, can be brought out into the light of day.]
1948
ONE DAY, I hope, a "Truth and Reconciliation Commission", on the South African model, will be set up here. It should be composed of Israeli, Palestinian and international historians, whose job will be to establish what really happened in this country in 1948.
In the 60 years that have passed since then, the events of the war have been buried under layer upon layer of Israeli and Palestinian, Jewish and Arab propaganda. A quasi-archeological excavation is needed in order to expose the bottom layer. Even the eye-witnesses who are still alive sometimes have problems distinguishing between what they actually saw and the myths that have twisted and falsified the events almost beyond recognition.
I am one of the eye-witnesses. In the last few days, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary, dozens of radio and television interviewers from all over the world have been asking me to describe what actually happened. Here are some of these questions and my answers to them. (If I repeat things I have already written about, I apologize.)
- How was this war different from others?
First of all, it was not one war but two, which followed one another without a break.
The first war was fought between the Jews and the Arabs in the country. It started on the morrow of the UN General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, which decreed the partition of Palestine between a Jewish and an Arab state. It lasted until the proclamation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948. That day marked the start of the second war - the one between the State of Israel and the neighboring countries, which threw their armies into the battle.
This was not a war between two countries for a piece of land between them, like the wars between Germany and France over Alsace. Neither was it a fratricidal struggle, like the American Civil War, where both sides belonged to the same nation. I categorize it as an "ethnic war".
Such a war is fought out between two different peoples who live in the same country, each of which claims the whole country for itself. In such a war, the aim is not only to achieve a military victory, but also to take possession of as much of the country as possible without the population of the other side. That is what happened when Yugoslavia broke up and when, not by accident, the odious term "ethnic cleansing" was born.
- Was the war inevitable?
At the time, I hoped until the last moment that it could be avoided (about that, later.) In retrospect it is clear to me that it was already too late.
The Jewish side was determined to establish a state of its own. This was one of the fundamental aims of the Zionist movement, founded 50 years earlier, and was strengthened a hundredfold after the Holocaust, which had come to an end only two and a half years before.
The Arab side was determined to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state in the country which they (rightly) considered an Arab country. That's why the Arabs started the war.
- What did you, the Jews, think when you went to war?
When I enlisted at the beginning of the war, we were totally convinced that we were faced with the danger of annihilation and that we were defending ourselves, our families and the entire Hebrew community. The phrase "There Is No Alternative" was not just a slogan, but a deeply felt conviction. (When I say "we", I mean the community in general and the soldiers in particular.) I don't think that the Arab side was imbued with quite the same conviction. That was their undoing.
This explains why the Jewish community was totally mobilized from the first moment on. We had a unified leadership (even The Irgun and the Stern Group accepted its authority) and a unified military force, which rapidly assumed the character of a regular army.
Nothing like this happened on the Arab side. They had no unified leadership, and no unified Arab-Palestinian army, which meant they could not concentrate their forces at the crucial points. But we learned this only after the war.
- Did you think that you were the stronger side?
Not at all. At the time, the Jews constituted only a third of the population. The hundreds of Arab villages throughout the country dominated the main arteries that were crucial to our survival. We suffered heavy casualties in our efforts to open them, especially the road to Jerusalem. We honestly felt that we were "the few against the many".
Slowly, the balance of power shifted. Our army became more organized and learned from its experience, while the Arab side still depended on "faz'ah" - the one-time mobilization of local villagers equipped with their own old weapons. From April 1948 on, we started to receive large quantities of light weapons from Czechoslovakia, which were sent to us on Stalin's orders. In the middle of May, when the expected intervention of the Arab armies was approaching, we were already in possession of a contiguous territory.
- In other words, you drove the Arabs out?
This was not yet "ethnic cleansing" but a by-product of the war. Our side was preparing for the massive attack of the Arab armies and we could not possibly leave a large hostile population at our rear. This military necessity was, of course, intertwined with the more or less conscious desire to create a homogeneous Jewish territory.
In the course of the years, opponents of Israel have created a conspiracy myth about "Plan D", as if it had been the mother of ethnic cleansing. In reality that was a military plan for creating a contiguous territory under our control in preparation for the crucial confrontation with the Arab armies.
- Do you say that at this stage there was not yet a basic decision to drive all the Arabs out?
One has to remember the political situation: according to the UN resolution, the "Jewish state" was to include more than half of Palestine (as it existed in 1947 under the British Mandate). In this territory, more than 40% of the population was Arab. The Arab spokesmen argued that it was impossible to set up a Jewish state in which almost half the population was Arab and demanded the withdrawal of the partition resolution. The Jewish side, which stuck to the partition resolution, wanted to prove that it was possible. So there were some efforts (in Haifa, for example) to convince the Arabs not to leave their homes. But the reality of the war itself caused the mass exodus.
It must be understood that at no stage did the Arabs "flee the country". In general, things happened this way: in the course of the fighting, an Arab village came under heavy fire. Its inhabitants - men, women and children - fled, of course, to the next village. Then we fired on the next village, and they fled to the next one, and so forth, until the armistice came into force and suddenly there was a border (the Green Line) between them and their homes. The Deir Yassin massacre gave another powerful push to the flight.
Even the inhabitants of Jaffa did not leave the country - after all, Gaza, where they fled, is also a part of Palestine.
- In that case, when was the start of the "ethnic cleansing" you spoke about?
In the second half of the war, after the advance of the Arab armies was halted, a deliberate policy of expelling the Arabs became a war aim on its own.
For truth's sake, it must be remembered that this was not one-sided. Not many Arabs remained in the territories that were conquered by our side, but, also, no Jew remained in the territories that were conquered by the Arabs, such as the Etzion Bloc kibbutzim and the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem. The Jewish inhabitants were killed or expelled. The difference was quantitative: while the Jewish side conquered large stretches of land, the Arab side succeeded only in conquering small areas.
The real decision was taken after the war: not to allow the 750 thousand Arab refugees to return to their homes.
- What happened when the Arab armies entered the battle?
At the beginning, our situation looked desperate. The Arab armies were regular troops, well trained (mostly by the British), and equipped with heavy arms: warplanes, tanks and artillery, while we had only light weapons - rifles, machine guns, light mortars and some ineffective anti-tank weapons. Only in June did heavy arms start to reach us.
I myself took part in the unloading of the first fighter planes that reached us from Czechoslovakia. They had been produced for the German Wehrmacht. Over our heads "German" planes on our side (Messerschmitts) were fighting "British" planes flown by Egyptians (Spitfires) .
- Why did Stalin support the Jewish side?
On the eve of the UN resolution, the Soviet representative, Andrei Gromyko, gave a passionately Zionist speech. Stalin's immediate aim was to get the British out of Palestine, where they might otherwise allow the stationing of American missiles. A sometimes forgotten fact should be mentioned here: the Soviet Union was the first state to recognize Israel de jure, immediately after the declaration of independence. The US recognized Israel at the time only de facto.
Stalin did not turn his back on Israel till some years later, when Israel openly joined the American bloc. At that time, Stalin's anti-Semitic paranoia also became apparent. The policy-makers in Moscow were then of the opinion that the rising tide of Arab nationalism was a better bet.
- What did you personally feel during the war?
On the eve of the war, I still believed in a "Semitic" partnership of all the inhabitants of the country. One month before the outbreak of war I published the booklet "War or Peace in the Semitic Region", in which I propounded this idea. In retrospect it is clear to me that this was far too late.
When the war broke out, I immediately joined a combat brigade (Givati). In the last days before I was called up I managed - together with a group of friends - to publish another booklet, entitled "From Defense to War", in which I proposed conducting the war with a view to the nature of the subsequent peace. (I was much influenced by the British military commentator Basil Liddell Hart, who advocated such a course during World War II.)
My friends at the time tried very strongly to convince me not to enlist, so I could remain free for the much more important task of voicing my opinions throughout the war. I felt that that they were quite wrong - that the place of every decent and fit young man at such a time was in the combat units. How could I stay at home when thousands of my age-group were risking their lives day and night? And besides, who would ever listen to my voice again if at the crucial moment of our national existence I did not fulfill my duty?
At the beginning of the war I was a private soldier in the infantry and fought around the road to Jerusalem, and in the second half I served in the Samson's Foxes motorized commando unit on the Egyptian front. That allowed me to see the war from dozens of different vantage points.
Throughout the war I wrote up my experiences. My reports appeared in the newspapers at the time and were later collected in a book entitled "In the Fields of the Philistines, 1948" (which will soon appear in English). The military censors did not allow me to dwell on the negative sides, so immediately after the war I wrote a second book called "The Other Side of the Coin", disguised as a literary work, so I did not have to submit it to censorship. There I reported, inter alia, that we had received orders to kill every Arab who tried to return home.
- What did the war teach you?
The atrocities I witnessed turned me into a convinced peace activist. The war taught me that there is a Palestinian people, and that we shall never achieve peace if a Palestinian state does not come into being side by side with our state. That this has not yet happened is one of the reasons why the 1948 war is still going on to this very day.
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The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process Position Paper
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- Written by Novick for Senate Novick for Senate
- Published: 10 May 2008 10 May 2008
- Hits: 4664 4664
[AUPHR recently received this new Position Paper from Steve Novick's campaign staff - Editor]
Novick for Senate
The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process Position Paper, April 2008
My father is Jewish and I am a supporter of the state of Israel and its right to security. I am also a believer in the right of the Palestinian people to a sovereign, viable state of their own, living side-by-side with Israel in peace. The United States carries a unique responsibility for seeing a successful conclusion to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and an end to this conflict that has contributed to the suffering of both peoples for decades.
I've had the pleasure in my campaign of meeting with many Oregonians who are strong advocates for a Palestinian state and for Israel and the discussions have enriched my perspective on the challenges and opportunities that face us. I've found that all sides appreciate my honesty and straightforwardness. I believe that only on that basis can we have a constructive dialogue about what our nation can do to bring about peace between the two peoples.
The Peace Process
Like many Americans, I feel for the suffering of the Palestinian people, and hope for the creation of a Palestinian state that can live next to Israel in peace. It had been my hope that the negotiations launched last November with President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert would be the final chapter in the peace process outlined in the Oslo Accords and the Quartet Roadmap. Although I believe that most Israelis and Palestinians are still committed to the peace process, the deteriorating situation in recent months has made progress very difficult.
Although I recognize the concerns of some that with the internal Palestinian conflict between Fatah and Hamas "there is not a partner for peace", I do not share that view. The United States should continue to urge further negotiations between Abbas' Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government. If we are to bolster the moderate Palestinian leadership and turn the people away from Hamas' extremism, we cannot afford another collapse of the peace process.
At the same time, given the current levels of violence and the lack of significant progress with peace negotiations, I recognize that the opportunities for a final agreement in the near future are limited. If the current process can be kept intact, I believe that a new Democratic administration in 2009 will offer a real opportunity to bring both sides to the table and to find a lasting solution to this deadly conflict. In the meantime, we should continue to foster dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians, ensure commitment to Roadmap obligations by both sides, and encourage all parties not to take steps that would prejudge a final settlement agreement.
-- The Barrier in the West Bank. The Israeli government's continued construction of a barrier in the West Bank, to my mind, is a symptom of the underlying challenges we face with the current state of affairs. The Israelis are correct to want to protect civilians from violent attacks. The Palestinians are correct that, in many places, this creates a substantial impediment to economic development and real personal hardship for many. Neither the existence or non-existence, nor the precise nature of the barrier, will end the use of violence by Palestinian groups or remedy the economic challenges facing the Palestinian territories; only a successful peace process can achieve that. Although I fully respect the desire of Israel to protect her people, I would publicly urge them not to use the installation and its construction in parts of the West Bank to prejudge the territorial negotiations of the peace process. (In other words, the barrier should not be assumed to be an outline of final borders still to be negotiated.)
-- Settlement Construction. New Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories will only complicate achieving a final peace agreement and undermine moderate Palestinian leadership. I believe that as a friend of Israel, the United States should urge the Israeli government to freeze all settlement construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as the physical expansion of existing settlements, in accordance with Israel's commitments to the U.S.-backed Roadmap to Peace.
Read more: The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process Position Paper
Israel PM urged to quit over corruption claim
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- Written by Toni O'Loughlin in Jerusalem Toni O'Loughlin in Jerusalem
- Published: 09 May 2008 09 May 2008
- Hits: 4154 4154
· Scandal threatens peace talks with Hamas
* Toni O'Loughlin in Jerusalem
* The Guardian,
* Saturday May 10 2008
Ehud Olmert faced pressure from colleagues and political rivals to resign yesterday after police released details of a corruption investigation into the Israeli prime minister, the fifth such inquiry since he replaced Ariel Sharon in 2006.
Olmert is suspected of illegally receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars from the US financier and political donor Morris Moshe Talansky, and possibly other foreigners, beginning in 1993 when he first ran to be Jerusalem's mayor and later when appointed as minister of industry, trade and labour in Sharon's government.
While Sharon also weathered bribery allegations as prime minister, only to be forced from the helm by a massive stroke, Olmert's colleagues and rivals are growing increasingly nervous about the number of scandals that now dog him.
Ronit Tirosh, a member of Olmert's centrist Kadima party, said she wanted "very much to believe him" but was uncomfortable about the investigation.
The National Religious party, which has been at loggerheads with Olmert over the freezing of settlement construction in the West Bank ,said the scandal was diverting attention from running the country.
While senior Labour members such as Ehud Barak, who is defence minister in Olmert's coalition government, remained silent, others said their party must withdraw. "Labour cannot remain in the same coalition with a prime minister tarnished by such deep corruption," Shelly Yacimovich, a Labour MP, said. Labour's departure, although a remote possibility for now, would bring down the government and would be likely to force elections, which are not due until 2010.
Polls carried out since late last year suggest the contest would return the rightwing Likud party to government with Binyamin Netanyahu at the helm.
The scandal also threatens to derail the Egyptian-sponsored ceasefire talks between Hamas and Israel as well as demolishing peace talks with the Palestinian Authority, which have already become bogged down with little hope of reaching a conclusion by the end of the year.
Olmert's relationship with Talansky began with the mayoral run in 1993. "Talansky assisted me in raising money," Olmert said in a statement to the media, adding that he received further help during another run for Jerusalem mayor in 1998. Talansky is also reported to have helped financially in Likud's internal 2002 elections before Olmert, led by Sharon, quit the party to form Kadima.
Talansky has been summoned to testify and on Thursday the state prosecutor, Moshe Lador, told the court that the Long Island financier "has expressed his concern to police that Olmert might send someone to hurt him".
Police are also investigating the roles of Olmert's friend, lawyer and former business partner Uri Messer, who is reported to be cooperating with the inquiry. Olmert, who has denied any wrongdoing, told the media on Thursday that Messer handled all the money but said that he believed the funds were handled properly.
They have also been questioning Olmert's longstanding chief of staff, Shula Zaken, who was previously dismissed from her job for inappropriate appointments to the tax office. However, Zaken has refused to answer questions and has been placed under house arrest.
Three Women from Haifa: Palestinian women speak on suffering, displacement, and solutions
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- Written by Aaron Lakoff - International Middle East Media Center Aaron Lakoff - International Middle East Media Center
- Published: 09 May 2008 09 May 2008
- Hits: 4561 4561
Sea, Haifa is a tragically beautiful city. Cascading hills and a
picture-perfect coast are juxtaposed with its history of violence and
dispossession.
Haifa was once a thriving Palestinian city. In 1945, the Palestinian
population of Haifa was over 85 thousand. On April 21, 1948, the Carmeli
brigade of the Haganah (the Zionist armed forces) began their attack on
Haifa, under what they called the Misbarayim, or scissors, plan. The
strategy was to attack the Palestinian residents of Haifa from three
sides, leaving only one side open for people to flee. Today, there are
only 25 500 Palestinian residents of Haifa, MAKING UP JUST 10% of the
city's population.
Israel often tries to promote an image of Haifa as a city of coexistence –
a place where Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Israelis live tolerantly
side by side. However, many Palestinian residents of the city, those who
survived the 1948 war and managed to stay, tell a different story than the
Israeli narrative.
These are the voices of three Palestinian women living in Haifa today.
Each leads different lives, and is involved in different projects, yet
they are united by historical bonds of displacement, suffering, and
resistance.
Read more: Three Women from Haifa: Palestinian women speak on suffering, displacement, and solutions
As it Turns 60, The Fear is Israel has Decided it can Get by Without Peace
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- Written by Jonathan Freedland Jonathan Freedland
- Published: 09 May 2008 09 May 2008
- Hits: 4007 4007
In the wee small hours on Israeli television, they show reruns of what was once a staple form of mass entertainment: kibbutz choirs - the men in pressed work shirts, the women in peasant skirts - singing Hebrew folk melodies exalting the Land of Israel, while a smiling audience joins in. The pictures were black and white, the sets cardboard, and the programmes interminable - a socialist-realist tableau of a simple farming nation engaged in wholesome, patriotic amusement.
Visiting Israel last month, I sat transfixed when I stumbled across the public service channel that replays those old shows. Tonight the national celebrations will be more up to date, as Israel marks its 60th anniversary with street parties this evening and beach barbecues tomorrow. Yet if the world is watching, trying to understand the place Israel was and what it has become, it could do worse than start with those cheesy TV specials.
For one thing, too many critics like to depict the establishment of Israel in May 1948 as little more than an act of western imperialism, inserting an alien, European enclave into the mainly Arab and Muslim Middle East. In this view, the Jewish Israelis of today, with their swimming pools and waterside restaurants, are no different from their counterparts in other settler societies - the whites of Australia or, more painfully, South Africa. A look at the faces of Jewish Israel is one easy rebuttal: the new nation that has formed by mixing Moroccan and Russian, Ethiopian and Kurd, is one of the most ethnically diverse in the world. But there is a more substantial counter-argument, one that can be picked up even on those old TV singalongs.
A favourite in the patriotic repertoire is Ein Li Eretz Acheret (I Have No Other Land). In a way, no other sentence conveys the tragedy of Israel and Palestine more concisely - because of course, and with good reason, the Palestinians feel exactly the same way. They too have nowhere else. Yet this Zionist anthem articulates something very deep in Israelis' sense of themselves: they are a nation formed by those who had no other place to live. The Holocaust, inevitably, looms large in this: the establishment of a Jewish state just three years after the liberation of Auschwitz was no coincidence. After 2,000 years, the world was finally persuaded that the Jews deserved what every other people regarded as a basic right: a place of their own.
A poignant reminder that Jews really had no other place - because the rest of the world did not want them - came with the death last month of Yossi Harel, captain of the Exodus, the leaking, rusting ship that carried 4,500 Holocaust survivors from Europe to Palestine in 1947, only to be sent back - by the British - first to France and then, incredibly, to Germany.
This, surely, gives the Israeli experience a different texture to the founding of, say, New Zealand, Argentina or the US. Those enterprises were fuelled chiefly by ambition and appetite for material resources. Even if those who landed on Plymouth Rock were fleeing religious intolerance, the circumstances of America's pioneers were not those of the Jews in the 1940s. The moral difference between the Jews and the white settlers of America, Africa and Australasia is the difference between a homeless man who needs a roof over his head and the landowner who fancies a second home. Those who lazily brand Zionism as imperialism should be able to tell the difference - and to remember that those who boarded those battered ships felt less like imperialists than refugees desperate for shelter.
The old TV shows provide another, related corrective. They are a reminder that in some ways early Israel was less Rhodesia than it was East Germany, a small country with socialism as the state religion. Back in the 1970s, all Israeli floors looked the same: the tiles were mass produced and there was only one style. Every toilet seat was made by a single kibbutz. Foreign investors were told they were welcome - so long as they were happy to sell a 51% stake in their company to the Histadrut, Israel's TUC.
That collectivism is all but gone. Most of the kibbutzim have privatised: individual members now own their own houses and earn different wages from each other. The kibbutz was never Israel, but it stands as a metaphor for what is happening in the wider society.
Israel itself is privatising, as its people withdraw from the collective sphere and retreat into their own, individual lives. Many speak of the bu'ah they construct for themselves, the bubble in which they can hide away from the fears and angst of Israel's "situation". Polling reveals the dichotomy: while nearly 40% believe the country faces a "serious threat of destruction" from its neighbours, around 83% are "satisfied or very satisfied" with their own lives.
All of which has a bearing on the other meaning of tomorrow's anniversary. The US administration has set the date as a deadline for Israelis and Palestinians to show some progress in the talks launched at Annapolis last November, ahead of President Bush's visit to the region next week.
Israel insists that it is straining every sinew seeking peace, just as it has insisted throughout the past 60 years. I heard the Israeli foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, explain with pride in London last week that she has kept talking to her Palestinian counterpart, even "on days of terror". Some of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's hawkish critics reckon the peace effort is, if anything, accelerating, in order to distract attention from the new, apparently serious, corruption inquiry just launched against him. And yet, there are few signs of a genuinely urgent Israeli desire for an accord with the Palestinians. The appearance of efforts for peace, in order to placate the legacy-hungry Bush, most certainly, but a fierce yearning for peace is harder to detect.
So when Jimmy Carter was in Jerusalem last month, carrying messages from Damascus and Hamas, no frontline Israeli minister would so much as meet him. Israel says it can't afford to legitimise Hamas, even indirectly, for fear of undermining the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas. Fine. In which case, surely, Israel would be doing all it could to bolster Abbas's credibility - by, say, removing West Bank outposts deemed illegal under Israeli law, or offering compensation to those Jewish settlers ready to leave occupied territory voluntarily and return to Israel-proper. Yet Olmert has done no such thing.
In this, the PM is doing no more than follow the national mood. Israelis have grown cynical about peacemaking. "We pulled out of Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005, and what did we get for our trouble? Katyushas from Hizbullah and Qassams from Hamas. No thanks." Besides, and few Israelis like to say this out loud, they believe they can get by without peace. Thanks, they whisper, to the separation barrier or wall, terror attacks have dwindled: Palestinian violence is contained. As for the so-called demographic factor - the notion that soon Jews and Arabs in the entire land ruled by Israel will reach numeric parity - that feels abstract and far away.
Israelis will party tonight, celebrating an economy that enjoyed 5.1% growth last year and which provides for many a good life. Only a few insomniacs will watch the old shows and remember the long-ago melodies, including the one that sounds more passe now than ever. It's called Shir L'shalom - and it is the song for peace.